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1.0 Introduction
The large magnet safety and protection effort this past year focussed on two areas:
the preliminary analysis of fault conditions for fusion magnet systems and the initial de-
velopment of a transportable, safety-oriented code for study of quench characteristics in
large magnets.
Section 2.0 presents the results of an assessment of electrical failure consequences
in a PF magnet system on the loads experienced by the PF and TF magnets. After
a general discussion of the manner in which the PF system is coupled to other reactor
subsystems, two types of faults on PF coils were selected for evaluation: short circuits
across the terminals and control system faults which lead to continued coil charging at
maximum power supply voltage. The study is done using a simplified model based on the
characteristics of the Compact Ignition Tokamak (major radius=2.1 m). These coils are
liquid-nitrogen cooled, but resistive in nature and would be expected to behave somewhat
differently than comparable superconducting coils.
It was found that the types of short circuits studied do not pose large risks provided
reasonable design margins for fault-related structural overload are assumed to be used.
The overloads are of order two, hence the structure must be capable of withstanding loads
of this level, but not in the course of normal, repeated operation. Voltage-driven faults
were found to be more severe, in that some form of protective action will be required to
keep overloads on selected PF coils and on the TF (out-of-plane) within the selected factor
of two relative to normal operation. In all cases the time scale for protective reaction
was considered to be feasible. Three different types of plasma disruption were considered,
but all were roughly equivalent in their overall impact on the load multiplication factors
during faults. The list of fault conditions considered was not exhaustive, but results are
encouraging provided that the assumed factor of two for structural overload in case of fault
is realistic. Further consideration, extending the list of possible faults is necessary as the
rlepqn evolves.
Section 3.0 presents the status of the initial development of a transportable code for
safety-oriented quench analysis. Modification of an existing stability code for internally
cooled superconductors has begun. Sample cases have been run and alterations have been
incorporated which will allow protective action to be taken.
Problems associated with time scale have been addressed in a preliminary fashion.
This involves the fact that stability and recovery (or nonrecovery) relative to a disturbance
for a conductor of this type occurs on the time scale of 1-10 ms whereas global parameters
associated with quench, protection, and safety occur on the time scale of tens of seconds to
minutes in large magnets. Further work with respect to code efficiency is required to allow
cases to be run with reasonable cpu time expenditure. We have also begun to address
the issue of voltage distribution within a quenching coil since we consider this to be an
important source for potential failure initiation. Further development of this code will be
performed in the coming fiscal year.
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2.0 THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTRICAL FAILURES
in PF MAGNET SYSTEMS FOR TOKAMAKS
M. ZIMMERMANN, M.S. KAZIMI, N.O. SIU, and R.J. THOME
2.1 Introduction
Failure consequences must be analysed to perform a risk and reliability analysis of
magnet systems. The consequences of two groups of electrical faults which originate in
the poloidal field (PF) coil system, shorts between coil terminals and faults with constant
applied voltage, have been investigated by using a simplified model of the Compact Igni-
tion Tokamak. It was found that shorts do not pose large risks.However, under selected
scenarios with constant applied voltage, the out-of-plane forces at the inner corner of the
toroidal field (TF) magnets were found to increase substantially. For all scenarios, the
type of plasma disruption had modest impact on the force distributions for the PF and
TF magnets.
The design of magnet systems for fusion devices, such as the Compact Ignition Toka-
mak (CIT) in the United States and the Next European Torus (NET) in Europe in-
volves considerable uncertainties about development and operation costs, system per-
formance,availability and safety considerations. Decisions made during the early design
phases may have a large impact on performance, costs and schedules and should therefore
be based upon, and reviewed in light of the overall system performance perspective.
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While earlier design studies such as the International Tokamak Reactor Study (INTOR)'
have been concerned principally with achieving engineering objectives, near-term and cur-
rently operating devices such as the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR)2 are now
emphasizing reliability programs and physics gains. In addition, the NET project has
adopted a reliability and availablility assurance program from its very beginning3 . A
generic framework for a design concept for fusion reactors that includes safety and reli-
ability considerations has also been developed4 and was proposed and expanded for an
integrated risk-based design objective for CIT5 . All these fusion studies have emphasized
that magnet systems remain a major concern in terms of system availability, costs and
safety of fusion devices. This is due to their high development costs, the large amounts of
energy stored in the coils during operation, and the long downtimes and high costs that
are associated with repairs or replacement of magnets. This makes the design of highly
reliable magnet systems mandatory.
Up to now, the development of fault trees and consequence analysis has been primar-
ily directed towards the toroidal field (TF) coil system'. The PF coil system has been
considered as having a similar fault tree structure. While this is certainly true for most
of the coil structures and cooling system, the operational characteristics and requirements
of the PF coil system are different due to the pulsed operation and more diversified oper-
ational tasks of the PF systems. Additionally, very little published work on fault analysis
such as that for TFTR' exists, and the database on fault consequences is still small, as
recent surveys have shown8 . Thus, the impact of the PF coil system on the overall magnet
system and other reactor components was investigated and an analysis of failures and fault
consequences for faults originating in the PF power supply and control system has been
performed.
2.2 A RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT STRATEGY
The outlined strategy is based on fault tree methodology that allows one to integrate
availability and consequence analysis in a common framework for systems with a gradually
developing database such as magnet systems. The fault tree for the magnet system was
divided into one for the TF coil and one for each component of the PF coil system. These
fault trees were structured in two basic parts:
1. a top part, which has the overall top event "unavailability of the magnet system"
(similar to the NET study',') and that contains only failure modes that are defined
in terms of the "unavailability" of a subsystem or component, and
2. a bottom part, extending from the lowest level of failure of the top tree down to the
basic failure modes of each subsystem or component. The failure modes in this tree are
described in terms of physical failures. By using this structure, the top part will only
contain "OR"-gates since the failure of a single subsystem will cause the complete
system to fail. Also, this part will require only minor modifications to be widely
applicable to most magnet systems. The NET reliability assessment6 has already
been found to provide most of the top part of the fault tree for the TF coil system.
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The bottom part is more specific and different for each design when followed to the
lowest level of failure.
The interface between the top and bottom of the fault tree also provides the basis for
the consequence analysis and lists the initiating events. An event tree analysis can then
be performed starting from each initiating event. The effective number of initiating events
can be reduced when events with similar consequences are grouped together. Finally the
consequences can be grouped into several levels of severity, where lower severity levels only
affect the plant availability while the higher levels are safety related. Thus, downtimes as
well as safety risks can be assessed in a single framework10 .
However, the current database,3 6 9 only permits drawing these fault trees on a generic
basis for the TF coil system' 0 . Parts of these trees, such as those for the coils and the
cooling system, can be transferred to the PF coil system, but the PF power supply and
Protection, Instrumentation and Control (PIC) system need more analysis. This is of
particular importance since a large number of TF coil system basic failure modes are
related to interactions with the PF coils.
2.3 INTERACTIONS OF THE PF COIL SYSTEM WITH OTHER SYSTEMS
The PF coil system is responsible for initiating and providing the plasma current
and for building up and controlling the position and shape of the plasma. This makes
the pulsed operation of the PF coils necessary as each coil will usually follow a different
current scenario.
The concept of a Fault Interaction Matrix2' 9 has been adopted here, since it allows
identification of the coupling between systems. Such a matrix has been developed for the
PF coil system and is shown in Table 2.1. It describes the impact of each PF coil subsystem
listed in the top row of the table on each of the systems listed in the left column. The table
includes interactions that occur during normal operation and under fault conditions. It
can be seen that only a few system pairs have no considerable impact on each other, which
demonstrates the intense coupling that is related to the PF coil subsystems. Most of this
coupling is due to the pulsed operation and the strong impact and reliance on feedback
information from the plasma. This requires a complex Protection, Instrumentation and
Control (PIC) system, that uses feedback and preprogrammed control and sets controls
on different time scales as necessary. Clearly, this complexity also leaves a large potential
for fault initiation.
2.4 THE POLOIDAL FIELD POWER SUPPLY AND CONTROL SYSTEM
The detailed designs of the PF power supply and PIC system differ in various fusion
devices but a review of the designs used for the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) 0 "
and the Joint European Torus (JET)12 provide the basic design and operation features
for these systems6 . It can be assumed that devices of the next generation such as the
Compact Ignition Tokamak (CIT) and the Next European Torus (NET) will use similar
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Table 2.1. Fault Interaction Matrix for the Poloidal Field (PF) Coil System
Fault Interaction Matrix for PF Magnet System
Poloidal Field Poloidal Field Poloidal Field Poloidal Field
Coils System Coils Cooling Power Supply PIC System
System System
PF Coils System EM,M,T T E,P M,E,P,C
PF Cooling System EM,M E P,C
PF Power Supply System EM,M E E C
PF PIC System EM,M E E E,C
TF Magnet System EM,M T E,P PC
First Wall, Blanket,
and Limiter System EM,M,P -_P P
Vacuum Vessel and Shield EM,M -_P P
Divertor System EM,M P P,C
Cryogenics Cooling
System and Cryostat EM,M M,T P P
Intermediate Cooling Cycles EM,M -_- _-
Plasma Heating System EM,M -_E,P P,C
Plasma Fueling System M P P,C
Plant Power Supply EM E E E,P
Central Plant PlC System EM E P E,P
EM: electromagnetic interaction, e.g. via eddy currents or electromagnetic force
NI: mechanical interaction, e.g. via common support structure
T: t hermal coupling, e.g. common cooling media
E: electrical interaction, e.g. coupling via busbars or shorts from intermittent connections
P: plasma interaction, e.g plasma disruptions
C: Control errors, e.g. control system malfunctioning or operator errors
designs. In general, the PF coils external to the TF coils are controlled on a slow time
scale and axe mainly operated with preprogrammed currents, while the coils inside the TF
coils (which will be referred to as internal or IC coils here) are controlled both actively
and rapidly. For the following discussion it is assumed that all coil-pair power supplies
provide unidirectional voltages, and mechanical reversing switches are used to allow for
bidirectional outputs. Such a circuit with independent unidirectional power supplies is
under discussion for CIT. It is economically acceptable and reduces the circuit complexity
considerably. The output current of the power supplies will be checked periodically and
a ground fault detection system will sense currents to ground. When a ground fault is
detected, a crowbar switch will be closed so that the coils will be connected to ground
and discharged. A switching network that includes a circuit breaker, mechanical reversing
switches and possibly a forced commutated circuit with resistors will produce the voltage
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for the coil terminals. Clock signals are provided by a master clock system, which receives
the waveform breakpoint information from a waveform generator in a high-level control
system. The coils of each mirror coil pair are assumed to be connected in series.
2.5 FAULT SCENARIOS FOR THE PF POWER SUPPLY AND PIC SYSTEM
The PF coils, power supply and PIC system have been analyzed for potential electrical
failures. This analysis has revealed that a large number of failures may be grouped in two
basic categories:
1. electrical shorts, where a pair or a single PF coil is shorted across terminals, between
turns or to ground, and,
2. erroneous control or switching, where coils are accidentally driven with a voltage that
does not produce the desired preprogrammed currents.
The design of the CIT machine with a mean radius of 2.1 m8 was taken as a reference
for this study. The CIT configuration includes 7 external PF coils, where 3 coils, PF1 to
PF3, comprise the central solenoid, PF4 and PF5 are located at the top of the TF coil,
and PF6 and PF7 are located along the outer leg of the TF coil. The location of these
coils is indicated in Fig. 2.5.1. Coils PF1 to PF3 are the main ohmic heating coils, and
PF4 and PF7 provide the basic plasma shaping. There are also 3 IC coils which will be
actively controlled on a short time scale. All coils are made of copper or copper/Inconel
laminate and are liquid-nitrogen cooled. The maximum magnetic field at 2.1 m will be
11 T and the maximum plasma current that is held for 5 s, is 11 MA. One complete pulse
takes 28.26 s and the coils are heated adiabatically during the pulse and cooled down to
LN 2 temperature between pulses.
The fault scenarios have been analyzed to investigate the potential for violating three
design factors:
1. forces and stresses in the external PF coils and the out-of-plane loads on the TF coils
should be kept within a chosen multiple of the maximum values that will be obtained
under normal operation conditions,
2. unanticipated force reversals are to be avoided, and
3. the maximum temperature in any coil should not exceed a selected temperature.
Because the plasma behavior depends strongly on the PF coil current scenario, any
disturbance quickly leads to a plasma disruption. Thus, a plasma disruption will follow a
major fault and three types of disruptions have been considered here:
1. a plasma disruption with stationary plasma and a plasma current breakdown of
-1 MA/ms,
2. a horizontal disruption, occurring within 5 ms, and
3. a vertical disruption which reduces the plasma current to zero within 210 ms.
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CIT Model with TF coil representation
152 elements, 14 points for each TF coil half
2.0.
R (m)
3.L.
Fig. 2.5.1. CIT Model with TF Coil Representation
PF1 to PF7 are external coils, IC1 to IC3 internal coils
Because the coil temperatures are a major concern, all scenarios investigated have
begun beyond the end of the plasma current flattop (EOFT) when most coil temperatures
have already reached a value close to their maximum. The currents in the unfaulted
coils have been assumed to follow the preprogrammed scenario. Only faults affecting the
external PF coils, not the internal IC coils have been considered. From the two groups
of faults under consideration, the attention was furthermore constrained to faults whose
consequences are likely not to be covered by other faults. Thus the analysis of faults that
involve short circuits has been limited to shorts between coil terminals (or leads) which
is considered adequate to cover the consequences of shorts to ground or between turns.
Shorts of complete mirror coil pairs as well as single coil shorts have been investigated.
For cases where coils are driven with undesired voltages, only the application of constant
voltages has been analyzed. Table 2.2 lists the scenarios investigated.
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An example of how the final scenario selection process was performed is given below.
In general, all short circuit scenarios are started at the EOFT because coil currents are
high at that time and the plasma still carries its maximum current so that a disruption
will be most severe. In case 3, a short in PF1 was chosen because of its high current
and its maxima for axial and radial stresses at EOFT. PF1 is a solenoid coil with a large
inductance that is located very close to PF2 and PF3. The question was whether the
driving currents in the neighboring coils would allow PF1 to reduce its current fast enough
so as to avoid temperature problems or whether the high inductance would lead to a slow
current decay. A slow decay would also yield a slow reduction of the forces on PF1 and
cause larger forces on PF2 and PF3. It would also lead to a change in the magnetic field
at the inner leg of the TF coils and cause higher out-of-plane forces. in case 4, similar to
case 3, a short was simulated in PF2 to investigate the effect of PF1 on PF2 when PF2
is completely passive and mainly driven by PF1 and PF3. In this case, temperatures are
of no concern, but the forces on the solenoid coils and at the inner leg of the TF coils are
assumed to be larger. Asymmetric shorts have been investigated for the lower PF2 coil,
since those shorts are most likely to occur in the solenoid coils because of the tight lead
placement inside the central support structure and the coaxial lead design to reduce the
field error. These scenarios have been combined with horizontal and vertical disruptions
because then the plasma moves inward and downward towards the solenoid coils.
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Table 2.2. List of Fault Scenarios Investigated
type of fault case time of fault description
no fault 0 EOFT all PF coils driven, plasma rampdown
mirror coil pair shorted I EOFT PF1, PF2, PF3 shorted
stationary disruption 2 EOFT PF4, PF5, PF6, PF7 shorted
3 EOFT PFI shorted
3a EOFT PF1 shorted, fault detected
4OFT PF2 shorted
5 EOFT PF4 shorted
6 EOFT PF7 shorted
mirror coil pair shorted 7 EOFT PF2 shorted
horizontal disruption
single coil shorted 8 EOFT PF2 (lower coil) shorted
horizontal disruption
single coil shorted 9 EOFT PF2 (lower coil) shorted
vertical disruption
constant voltage 10. EOFT PFl, -1.6kV (voltage at EOFT)
11 EOFT PFl, -4kV (full voltage)
12 EOFT PF3, 3kV (full voltage)
13 EOFT PF4, -6kV (full voltage)
14 EOFT PF7, -1.2kV (voltage at EOFT)
s15 EOFT PF7, -4kV (full voltage)
constant voltage 16 EOPC PF1, 1.9kV (voltage at EOPC)
17 EOPC PF7, 1.3kV (voltage at EOPC)
EOFT: end of plasma current flattop, at t=18.76s for
EOPC: end of plasma current, at t=26.26s for CIT
CIT
2.6 MODEL AND SIMULATION METHOD
A two-dimensional model of CIT was used for simulating the fault scenarios. Two
versions of this model were used. The basic version is symmetric with respect to the
midplane. The second version, which is shown in Fig. 2.5.1, contains elements below and
above the midplane, thereby allowing asymmetric behavior to be modeled . It uses a
multielement representation of the plasma, leading to a total of 304 elements for the whole
cross section. In both versions the TF coil was approximated by a set of straight-line
connections between 14 points for each half of the TF coil.
The current scenario in each of the elements was obtained by solving the matrix
differential circuit equations. For all fault scenarios, the current in the TF coil was assumed
to be constant at a value corresponding to the maximum magnetic field of 11 T at the
magnetic axis. The current scenarios were used to obtain the forces on the PF coils and
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the out-of-plane forces at each point of the TF coil. Furthermore, the total separating
force, overturning moment and torque were computed for each half coil. For all cases
the unfaulted PF coils were driven with their preprogrammed currents, assuming that
the currents rather than the voltages will be controlled. The initial currents were zero at
EOFT in all passive elements and in the IC coils for all scenarios because it was assumed
that eddy currents had decayed during the plasma current flattop whereas the PF coil
currents change relatively slowly. The plasma and the PF coils were started with their
design currents at EOFT. The IC coils were modelled as shortcircuited but not connected
in series.
2.7 SIMULATION RESULTS
The forces that occur under fault conditions have been compared with those that
occur under normal operating conditions (case 0 in Table 2.2). Multiplication factors
for forces and moments were obtained by dividing the maximum value for each force
during a fault scenario by the corresponding maximum value under normal conditions
when started at EOFT. Multiplication factors greater than 2 were assumed to signal a
potential for failure, i.e., the design practices were assumed to embody a safety factor of
2 or higher. An envelope of allowable forces and moments was adopted that constrained
failure consequences to multiplication factors larger than 2.
The analysis of the temperature results revealed that the temperature is of no concern
for the faults involving shorted coils. In cases where coils are voltage driven, the temper-
atures will exceed the critical value in any case since adiabatic heating is assumed. Here,
an upper temperature limit of 330 K was adopted. However, under all fault conditions,
it took a minimum of 4 a to reach this temperature. This implies that corrective actions
taken within 4 s or less avoid violation of the temperature limit.
Figures 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 show the maximum multiplication factors for all scenarios.
Not included in these data are the cases in which coils PF4 or PF7 are driven with the
full available voltage. In all voltage-driven cases, only those results have been included
in which the highest temperature in any coil was still below the critical temperature. It
can be seen from Fig. 2.7.1, that only coil PF7 shows a multiplication factor for vertical
forces that lie outside the allowable range. The maximum factor of 4 occurs only when
PF7 is driven continuously with its voltage at EOFT (case 14), while in all other cases the
factors are below 2.3. These results show that even when coils with large inductances and
high currents (such as PF1) are faulted and the fault remains undetected, the decay time
constants are short enough to permit fast current reduction. Also, coils PF5 and PF6 were
found to be of very little concern due to their small currents and distant location from the
plasma, the solenoid and the TF coils.
The out-of-plane forces on the TF coils were also considered to be covered principally
by the design margin. Fig. 2.7.2 shows that only points 5 and 6, which are located at the
inner corner of the TF coil, have multiplication factors as high as 4.4. For most cases,
and in particular for faults originating in coils PF4 or PF7, large multiplication factors are
found. The total force and moments on a half coil show multiplication factors of up to 3.2.
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When one of the coil pairs along the outer leg of the TF coil is driven accidentally
with its full available voltage, the loads become very severe. A summary is given in Tables
2.3 and 2.4 of multiplication factors for the two cases where PF4 and PF7 are driven to
full voltage (cases 13 and 15).
The fault involving PF7 yields high forces on PF7 itself, with a factor of 13 for the
vertical direction (compressive force) when the temperature in coil PF7 reaches its limiting
value. The distribution of the out-of-plane force along the TF coil perimeter changes in a
way to bring the factors for the totals up to 4.2. These effects are still further emphasized
for the case when PF4 is driven with its full voltage. PF4 is the coil with the highest
voltage because of its strong contribution to the loop voltage at plasma initiation. For
this fault, the bursting forces on PF4 achieve multiplication factors of 13 within the first
2 s. At the same time, the out-of-plane forces at the inner corner of the TF coil have
reached factors in the same range. Thus, fast detection and protective actions are required
to prevent coil damage.
As an example of the effect of mitigating actions, a rapid current rampdown in all coils
within 1 s after a detection time of 2 s was simulated for a short in PF1 (case 3a). This
reaction reduces the forces on the PF coils very rapidly, but leads to higher out-of-plane
forces at the inner corner of the TF coil. More analysis is needed but this example shows
that reaction scenarios must be carefully chosen.
No unexpected force reversals of significant magnitude have been found in any of the
cases. Also, the effect of the type of plasma disruption was locally constrained and of
minor importance when compared with the maxima occurring under normal conditions.
However, it was found that the IC coils play a major role in the distribution and the
magnitudes of the out-of-plane forces on the TF coils. The IC coils are located close to the
plasma and have a strong impact on the local poloidal field. With the IC coils shorted,
maximum eddy currents of up to 1.2 MA in the IC coils were obtained. The IC coils will be
used to control plasma parameters and cannot be considered as being completely passive.
Simulations with controlled IC coil currents (at zero) indicate that, when compared to a
circuit with shorted IC coils, the out-of-plane forces were higher by factors of 2 to 4, in
particular at the inner corner and less emphasized along the outer leg of the TF coils.
Thus, the design of the IC coils and their controls is important for controlling the out-of-
plane loads. Simulations using shorted IC coils seem to yield conservative results and it is
clear that further consideration is necessary as the coil design solidifies.
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case 13 case 15 case 13 case 15
PFI 1 I .1 1 1
P F2 0.2 0.5 1.2 1.2
PF3 0.9 1.6 5 0.6
PF4 79 (13)* 1.2 19 (2.8)* 0.5 i
PF5 1 1.4 1 1.5
PF1 1 1 1
PF7 - 2.8 1 13
limit temperature reached after 6s
* after 2s
Multiplication Factors for the Forces on the PF Coils for Cases 13
and 15, Where the Full Available Voltage is Applied Continuously
TF coil
point/total
2
case l3
1.5
__________ I q
3 1.5
case 15
1.5
1.4
4 4 1.4
5  38 (14)* 1.5
6 35 (13)* 3
7 1 1.6
8 1 1.8
9 1 1.6
10 1.1 1.8
11 1.1 2
12 1.7 3
13 1 1
Ft 5 4.2
M_ _ 3.6 3
M, 1.1 2.8
* after 2s
F, total separating force on half coil
M, overturning moment on half coil
M, torque on half coil
Table 2.4. Multiplication Factors for the Out-of-plane Forces on the TF Coils
for Cases 13 and 15, Where the Full Available
Voltage is Applied Continuously
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Table 2.3.
radial directioncoil vertical direction
2.8 EVALUATION OF FAULT CONSEQUENCES
The potential for high consequence or critical faults seems to be small for the scenarios
considered. A reliable and modestly fast detection and protection system should be able to
avoid damage to coils or leads and constrain damage to the faulty component. However, if
the protection system fails, faults with voltage-driven coils may cause severe consequences.
For CIT, the temperature in the driven coil achieved the limiting value of 330 K for every
case analysed. At some higher temperature, severe degradation of the insulation involves
the potential for turn-to-turn shorts and arcing. Overloads or load redestributions remain
the major concern. For normal conducting magnets, overloaded copper will crack which
reduces the effective current-carrying cross section of the conductor and leads to additional
heating on further operation. This could ultimately cause. the temperature-related prob-
lems that have already been described. Also, the out-of-plane forces on the TF coils have
their highest multiplication factors at the inner corner, which is not directly supported by
an external structure. These effects are even more important for superconducting mag-
nets because of the strain sensitivity of the superconducting material. and the danger for
the loss of cryogenic stability. In addition, considerable uncertainty still exists about the
combined effect of irradiation and mechanical loads on materials and bonding materials.
2.9 CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of potential failures of the TF coil system has shown that a large number
of basic failure modes are related to the pulsed operation of the PF coil system. The
analysis of interactions of the PF coils system with other reactor systems revealed the
intense coupling of those systems. Also, the PF coil power supply and control system is
complex and has a potential for fault initiation. Two groups of fault scenarios that initiate
in this system, shorts between coil terminals and voltage-driven scenarios, were further
examined. A total of 17 fault scenarios were simulated with a two-dimensional model.
It was found that shorts do not pose large risks for the magnet system. For scenarios
with voltage-driven coils, the temperature limit is also of little concern and a modestly
fast protection system will be sufficient. However, for some voltage-driven faults, mainly
when coils PF4 or PF7 were involved, high bursting forces on the PF coils were obtained
and much larger out-of-plane forces than under normal operating conditions. It was found
that the terminal constraint on the IC coils has a strong impact on the distribution and
magnitude of the out-of-plane loads but the type of disruption has modest impact on the
force distributions. Future work is needed to establish the severity of these effects, their
implications for the design of the PF power supply and control system, the design of the
protection system, and on the reliability of the overall magnet system.
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3.0 Preliminary Analysis of Quench Propagation and Voltage Distribution
in Superconducting Coils
Marie Oshima
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Two types of cooling are used for superconducting magnets: bath cooling and internal
cooling. In bath cooling, the superconductors are immersed in a pool of liquid helium, while
with internal cooling, supercritical helium is circulated through passages in the conductors
or through a conduit containing the conductor. The latter design, the internally cooled
superconductor(ICS), (which also may be called force-cooled superconductor) is evaluated
here for safety in fusion applications2 3' 4 .
Heat is generated by several sources in a fusion system including nuclear heat deposi-
tion, plasma disruption and AC losses5',. These heat sources raise the conductor temper-
ature and may result in a quench (a transition from the superconducting to the normal
state without recovery)7',. If quench occurs, a large amount of energy is released and as
the helium is heated and vaporizes it can cause large increases in pressure and temperature
in the coil. These significant changes in the helium flow may endanger both the magnet
system and the refrigeration system. Therefore it is necessary to take these factors into
account in the design of superconducting magnets.
Analyses in this report are based on a code originally developed by V.D. Arp9 . This is a
one-dimensional time-dependent program designed to calculate the stability characteristics
of an internally cooled superconductor. Its primary purpose was to determine whether or
not a given superconductor and flow configuration would be stable relative to a thermal
pulse of particular size and duration. Hence, it was limited to a constant current condition
or an exponential decay with a fixed decay constant. Since our purpose was to study the
failure mode of a superconductor in a nonrecovery condition, the code has been modified
by introducing a finite difference form of a circuit equation to represent the coil discharge
10,11
Three different cases were analysed in this study by using the modified code: recov-
ery, nonrecovery without the finite difference form of the current equation (i.e., constant
current), and nonrecovery using the finite difference form (i.e., current decay with noncon-
stant coil resistance). Future work will involve extensions to this code to improve efficiency,
graphical output and ease of use.
-17-
3.2 THEORY AND NUMERICAL MODEL
3.2.1 Thermodynamic Analysis
The model' assumes that a helium-cooled superconductor is initially at steady-state
for t < 0, and that a localized heat input Qo is then applied to the superconducting coil
as is shown schematically in Fig. 3.2.1. The computer program calculates the subsequent
thermal behavior of the superconducting coil including temperature and pressure profiles
of the helium system.
In the calculations, the following assumptions are made:
1. The length-to-diameter ratio (LID) of the helium volume inside the conductor is
large. Therefore, one-dimensional flow is considered. The helium properties such as
temperature, pressure, and velocity are assumed to be uniform over the flow cross
section.
2. The helium is assumed to be compressible.
3. Temperature is assumed to be uniform over the conductor cross section.
3.2.1.1 Governing Equations
The governing equations are derived from mass, momentum, and energy equations in
terms of the helium pressure, enthalpy, and velocity. Nomenclature is given in Appendix
I. The equations are
Ov Ov 1 OP
- -- F, (3.2.1)
at ex p* 8X '
OP _ OP
S-p__ _ - v-- + p*qO(Qh + vF) , (3.2.2)
8H OH 2 &
- -5 -- c + (1 + 4)(Qh + vF) . (3.2.3)
The energy balance equation for the superconducting coil consists of the initial per-
turbation, joule heating, heat transfer from the conductor to the helium and the axial
thermal conduction. The energy balance is given by
_ 0 ( Qo+Q - Qh + 2T, +k 9T,, ,
tA +k + p . (3.2.4)
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The heat removal by helium at the conductor surface, Qh is given by
Qh = Phh(T. - T) (3.2.5)
The heat transfer coefficient h has been evaluated by both experimental and theoretical
studies.6 '9
Joule heating Qi includes current-sharing between the superconductor and the cop..
per when the current I is between the critical temperature T, and the current-sharing
temperature Tc,. Thus, Q3 is expressed as
j - Ac2 P .(3.2.6)
ACUf
where f is given by:
f = 0, x < x1, Tw < te,, (3.2.71
TC - Tf ', Tc, <T. <Tc , (3.24
f = 1.0, TeC < TW . (3.2.)
As the above equations show, if the conductor temperature Tw is lower than Tc,, all the
current flows in the superconductor, and no joule heating is observed. If T. is higher thm
TC,, current flows in the copper and joule heating is observed.
The initial perturbation Qo(x, t) varies as a function of time and position. As shown
in Fig. 3.1, Qo is a continuous function in terms of the distance x (0 < t < At) and i
given by
Qo(x, t) = , < x1,xo> x4
r( - l1) 2Qo(x, t) = Eo(l + sin( ))sin2 (7r ), xl x<x2
Qo(x,t)=Eo, x2<x<x3
r(x - 2) 2QO(x, t) = Eo(l - sin(7x-12 ))sin 2(7r ), x3 < x<x4 (3.2.1
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where
Eo =
ZAth
x1 = L - 0.5w,
x2= L1 + 0.5w,
x3 = l2 - 0.5w,
x4 = 12+ 0.5w. (3.2.11)
The variables in Eqs.(3.1)-(3.5) are defined as illustrated in Fig. 3.1 and are given as input
data (see Appendix II).
3.2.1.2 Boundary Conditions
It is assumed that the pressure in the reservoirs connected by valves to the supercon-
ducting coil is constant at both the inlet and outlet. Thus, the boundary conditions are
given by:
P = Po ± (valve) x 0.5p*v 2 . (3.2.12)
In Eq.(3.2.12), the negative sign is used for the inlet boundary condition and the positive
sign for the outlet. The variables Po and valve are determined by using the steady-state
value of P, p*, and v of the superconductor near the inlet or outlet.
3.2.2 Failure Mode Analysis
When quench occurs, some of the energy is dissipated into the copper stabilizer of
the conductor. Under certain conditions, for example, if the energy is dissipated in a small
region of the coil, the copper may melt or the insulation may overheat. Another possibility
is that the helium pressure may increase to an unsafe level, if not controlled. Thus, it is
necessary to ensure that the energy is dissipated in a controlled manner for coil protection.
A superconducting magnet may be protected by a circuit such as that illustrated
schematically in Fig. 3.2. The coil is charged by closing the switch and is discharged rapidly
by opening the switch. If the switch is opened when quench starts, the initial current is 1 o
at t = to. The magnetic energy initially stored in the inductance L is partially dissipated in
the external dump resistor Rd. The variable R(t) represents the time-varying coil resistance.
The resistance R(t) takes zero as an initial value and increases monotonically with time in
the nonrecovery situation, because the resistive region incapable of recovery grows in size.
- 20-
There are two potential problems associated with the presence of R(t) in a super-
conducting coil. First, an unacceptable local temperature rise may occur. Secondly, arcing
may be initiated due to an abnormal voltage distribution in the coil.
The governing equation associated with the circuit after the switch is opened is:
L = -I [Rd+ R(t) . (3.2.13)
In a low-current-density system, Rd is often more dominant than R(t). Hence, Eq.
(3.2.13) reduces to the following:
I= I,,exp(-t/r) . (3.2.14)
where T = L/Rd is the time constant.
However, in a high-current-density system, R(t) may become comparable to Rd, be-
cause the normal zone propagates rapidly, and this rapid propagation leads to a rapid
increase in R(t). Hence, Eq. (3.2.12) is solved by using a forward integration in time which
is based on the finite difference form:
I(to + nAt) = I(to + (n - 1)At) 1 - - (Rd + R(to + (n - I)At)) (3.2.14)
where n is the number of the time increment steps and t in Eq. (3.2.12) is equal to
to + (n - 1)At. Initial values for current and resistance are given by I(to) = Io and
R(to) = 0 at n = 1. In computing the transient, R(t) is recalculated at each instant of
time and incremented before it is used in Eq. (3.2.14).
The total resistance R(t) increases with time. At any instant its value is the sum of
resistive volume increments. Since the copper area A,, of the conductor cross section is
assumed to be constant along the conductor length, the resistance develops with the time
and length increments as illustrated in Fig. 3.3 and is given by
p(T )R(t) = J dR = j A dx . (3.2.15)
fo 0 Acu
In the above calculation of R(t), the resistivity is updated at each time increment. The
resistivity is a function of temperature and is determined by the physical properties of the
conductor.
-21-
The resistive voltage propagating along the wire at any point and at any instant in
time t is given by
VR(Z, t)= I Aj) dx . (3.2.16)
In these calculations, a length of wire which is still superconducting at time t is not
involved in the integration of Eq.(3.2.16).
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3.3 NUMERICAL RESULTS
3.3.1 Computer Program
The computer program originally developed by V.D. Arp9 was designed to determine
both superconductor and forced-flow helium behavior by solving Eqs. (3.2.1)-(3.2.4) pre-
sented in Section 3.19. In order to analyze a failure mode, the finite difference form of the
circuit equation representing the coil discharge was introduced into the original program
for this study. The computer program is run on the Cray computer at MFECC( Magnet
Fusion Energy Computer Center).
A simplified flow chart of the computer code is presented and the main structure
of the program is summarized in Appendix III. Input data consist of the geometry and
physical characteristics of the conductor (components, size and material), operating con-
ditions (magnet field and current), initial helium conditions (temperature and pressure),
initial perturbation characteristics (total pulse energy, pulse time and heating length) and
time step. Output data consist of the temperature of both conductor and helium, thermal
properties of the helium flow, and current and voltage of the conductor after quench at
each time step. Then, the output data are stored and can then be used at a later time to
generate graphic presentations. Details of the input and output data are given in Appendix
II.
The program was modified to stop calculating when recovery is achieved. When non-
recovery is observed, the current is recalculated by using the finite difference form of the
equation representing the discharge circuit (Fig 3.2) and iteration is continued until tem-
perature or pressure reaches a predetermined limit.
The criteria for recovery are the following:
1. t > 2ZAth
2. T. < T.
3. Th > Te,
If these criteria are violated, the superconducting coil cannot recovery, which is the case
of interest for this study.
3.3.2 Sample Numerical Results
The computer program modified for this study analyzes the recovery or quench prop-
agation of a Nb3Sn superconducting coil. Three test case analyses are presented: recovery
-25-
(case 1), and nonrecovery with and without the finite difference form of the discharge
circuit equation (cases 2 and 3). Appendix II-(2) shows the operating conditions for each
case.
3.3.2.1 Recovery Case
Figs. 3.1 and 3.2 show the current and resistive voltage profiles over a superconducting
coil as a function of time. Figs. 3.3 - 3.5 show conductor and helium temperature, and
helium pressure profiles in the middle of the coil (x = 44.0 m) as a function of time. Since
this is the recovery test case, current is constant as seen in Fig. 3.3.1. Resistive voltage
and conductor temperature have peak values at t = 0.075 s as is shown in Figs. 3.3.2 and
3.3.3. Characteristic recovery behavior can be seen in Figs. 3.3.2. and 3.3.3. The initial
heat perturbation causes the conductor temperature to increase until it reaches a peak
value. Then it starts to decrease as it is cooled by the helium, and finally the temperature
of both the conductor and helium become equal. The resistive voltage in the copper rises
as the temperature increases.
Figs. 3.3.6 - 3.3.9 describe conductor and helium temperature, resistive voltage and
helium pressure at t = 0.0025, 0.005 and 0.06 s as a function of position along the conduc-
tor. Since the helium has enough heat capacity to cool the conductor against the initial
heat perturbation, the temperature of the conductor increases locally for a short time, but
then quickly decreases to the superconducting temperature range (Fig. 3.3.6). The helium
temperature changes in relation to the conductor temperature as shown in Fig. 3.3.7. Fig.
3.3.8 also shows that the resistive voltage increase corresponds to the temperature increase,
but returns to zero after recovery is achieved.
Heated helium spreads with the velocity of sound beyond the initially heated zone due
to adiabatic compression of the helium as is shown in the pressure profile of Fig. 3.3.9.
3.3.2.2 Nonrecovery Case at Constant Current
- Without the Finite Difference Form of the Discharge Equation -
Here, the total initial heat pulse is larger than that used the case presented in Section
3.2.1 in order to obtain nonrecovery. Since the circuit switch is assumed to be closed even
after quench, the finite difference form for discharge is not applied to this case. Hence,
there is no current decay as seen in Fig. 3.3.10, which is a graph of the current profile as a
function of time. Fig. 3.3.11 shows the resistive voltage across the conductor as a function
of time. The slight discontinuity at t = 1.25 s is caused by the computing time increment
algorithm, because the time increment automatically becomes large when nonrecovery
starts. Fig. 3.3.12 shows profiles of the conductor and helium temperatures at the middle
of the conductor (x = 44.0 m). The helium flow initially cools the conductor, but the
temperature increases because the helium does not have enough heat capacity relative to
-26-
the large initial heat perturbation. As a result, system loses its cooling capacity because
of excessive joule heating and the temperature rises.
Figs. 3.3.13 - 3.3.15 show the conductor and helium temperature profiles, and the
resistive voltage profile at t = 0.0025, 0.0075 and 2.11 s as a function of a position along
the conductor. The temperature increase seen in these figures indicates that the normal
region is propagating. As the normal region grows, the temperature becomes higher due to
the increase in joule heating at constant current. This results in an increase in the resistive
voltage. Fig. 3.3.16 shows the helium pressure profile as a function of position. Helium
pressures at this high level are beyond the accuracy of the correlations in this code. Future
modifications are required to obtain accurate output data at high pressure levels.
3.3.2.3 Nonrecovery Case with Current Decay
- With the Finite Difference Form of the Discharge Equation -
Unlike the condition in Section 3.3.2.2. once nonrecovery occurs the circuit switch (Fig.
3.3.2) is opened. In order to model this effect, the finite difference form of the discharge
equation is applied to the calculations.
Figs. 3.3.17 and 3.3.18 show the current and resistive voltage profiles across the con-
ductor as a function of time. The nonrecovery situation is obtained at t = 0.11 s, but
the discharge circuit causes the current to decay rapidly as shown in Fig. 3.3.17. This
current decay results in a decrease in the resistive voltage. Although the resistive voltage
is a function of temperature, the decrease in the resistive voltage is caused principally by
the current decay. The conductor and helium temperatures become constant after 5 s as
shown in Fig. 3.3.19.
Figs. 3.3.20 and 3.3.21 show the temperature profiles of conductor and helium at
t = 0.0025,4.11 and 15.11 s as a function of position. The temperature in each increases to
120.0 K. The resistive voltage shows a different behavior from that in case 3.3.2.2 because
of the current decay. As is shown in Fig.3.3.22, the entire voltage increases in t = 4.11 s
and decreases to about zero in correspondance with the current decay, because the current
also becomes zero at t = 15.11 s. The helium pressure grows to 200 atm as shown in Fig.
3.3.23, but this is below that reached in the previous constant current case.
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3.4 CONCLUSIONS
A computer program developed by V.D. Arp9 has been modified to analyze recovery
and quench propagation in a superconducting coil with and without control of the current
decay during a discharge .
Three test cases were designed to examine the performance of the program. Analyses
show the characteristic behavior of the conductor for both recovery (Figs. 3.2, 3.3 and 3.6
- 3.9) and nonrecovery.(Figs. 3.12 - 3.15 and 3.19 - 3.22). For the nonrecovery condition, a
finite difference form of the circuit equation was introduced into the original code in order
to analyze the coil behavior with a discharge circuit. The difference between cases with and
without the finite difference form is seen in the current profiles as shown in Figs. 3.3.10 and
3.3.17. This difference in the current profiles affects the resistive voltage behavior as shown
in Figs. 3.3.11 and 3.3.15 (recovery), and Figs. 3.3.18 and 3.3.22 (nonrecovery). Operating
parameters were chosen arbitrarily to demonstrate both recovery and the nonrecovery
behavior, and to examine the effect of coil discharge. The program must now be verified
by using a realistic range of operating parameter values.
In the nonrecovery cases, very high pressures (200 atm) were obtained. Since some
coolant property correlations become uncertain above 30 atm, the resulting pressure in the
nonrecovery cases include the uncertainty. In order to perform a more accurate analysis, it
will be necessary to obtain helium property correlations for high pressure and temperature.
This section has emphasized the response of a superconducting coil to temperature
and current changes. The effect of the magnetic field is not considered here. As a result,
the magnetic field is assumed to be constant under all circumstances. In future studies,
the effect of the magnetic field, particularly due to coil discharge, will be introduced into
the program.
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